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PROVISIONS IN THE NEW
MISSOURI CRIMINAL CODE
The Missouri Committee to Draft a Modern Criminal Code under-
took in October, 1969, a comprehensive revision of the criminal laws of
Missouri for the first time since 1835.' A core project of the Committee
was sentencing reform.2 Missouri presently lacks a rationally conceived
sentencing system, due to piecemeal legislative revision for more than a
century.3 Inconsistent sentencing provisions contribute to disparity of
sentences among offenders of comparable culpability.4 The Committee
attempted to develop a rational and effective sentencing system that
would minimize such disparity yet permit sufficient flexibility to impose
a sentence that fits the specific circumstances.5 To accomplish this ob-
jective the Committee proposed three major changes in sentencing prac-
tice: classification of crimes into distinct sentencing categories based on
the seriousness of the offense, with an uncomplicated range of penalties
assigned to each category; 6 vesting in the court the exclusive responsi-
bility for fixing punishment while requiring that the jury, if there is one,
be informed of the permissible range of penalties; 7 and appellate review
of sentences.
8
These proposed changes differ significantly from existing criminal
statutes under which each offense usually carries its own specific range
of penalties.9 The basic sentencing authority is currently in the jury;
however, in practice so many exceptions exist that sentencing usually is
done by the court.' 0 No current statutory provision expressly authorizes
appellate review of sentences and the appellate courts have not con-
1. THE COMMITEE TO DRAFT A MODERN CRIMINAL CODE, THE PROPOSED
CRIMINAL CODE FOR THE STATE OF MissouRi 6 (1973) [hereinafter cited as PRO-
POSED CODE].
2. Anderson, Sentencing Under the Proposed Missouri Code-The Need for Reform,




6. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 1, at 6; Anderson, supra note 2, at 550-53.
7. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 1, at 6; Anderson, supra note 2, at 567-68.
8. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 1, § 2.070; Anderson, supra note 2, at 562-65.
9. Anderson, supra note 2, at 550.
10. §§ 546.410, .430-.460, RSMo 1969 (repealed effective January 1, 1979);
Anderson, supra note 2, at 568.
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strued their general authority to review criminal judgments to include
the review of sentences."
Using this Proposed Code as a guide, the Missouri legislature has
enacted a new Criminal Code, to become effective January 1, 1979.12
Two major departures from the Proposed Code were made: some de-
gree of jury sentencing was retained, 13 and appellate review of sentences
was rejected. Having in mind these departures from the Proposed Code,
this note will attempt to explain the sentencing provisions of the new
Code and to indicate areas where problems of interpretation could arise.
The initial consideration is the sentencing function of the court. For
this purpose the jury's role initially will be disregarded. Literally, the
court's function is to decide the extent or duration of sentence or other
disposition to be imposed "under all the circumstances." 14 This author-
ity is very broad, but the Code provides restrictions on the court in the
form of authorized ranges of punishments for the different classes of
offenses, authorized dispositions for the different classes of offenses, and
factors to be considered by the court in determining the proper disposi-
tion.
For all offenses defined under the Code, there are specified certain
authorized dispositions that may be made by the court.' 5 These dispos-
itions are allocated by the class of offense and to some degree by the
type of offender. The new Code also provides that the punishment to be
imposed for offenses defined outside the Code and not repealed by the
Code is to be that provided by the statute defining such offense." The
Code does not deprive the court of any authority conferred by law to
impose any other civil penalty. 17
11. Anderson, supra note 2, at 562-65.
12. Act No. 73, § A, 1977 Mo. Legis. Serv. 275 (West).
13. Mo. CRIM. CODE § 557.036.2 (effective January 1, 1979).
14. Id. § 557.036.1 (emphasis added).
15. Id. § 557.011. The dispositions provided by the Code differ from those
provided by current provisions in only two regards. While the court retains the
authority provided by § 549.071 RSMo to suspend imposition of sentence with-
out placing the person on probation, when sentence is pronounced and execu-
tion is suspended, the court must place the person on probation. Id. §§
557.011.2(4), .011.3(3), .011.4(3). The Code also provides a "split sentence" pro-
vision whereby the court may impose a period of detention in jail or prison as a
condition of probation imposed after suspending imposition of sentence. Id. §
557.011.2(5). Although Missouri courts had previously used detention as a con-
dition of probation, the Missouri Supreme Court in State ex rel. St. Louis County
v. Stussie, 556 S.W.2d 186 (Mo. En Banc 1977), found that the current statutes
do not authorize such practice.
16. Id. § 557.011.1. This provision was designed to avoid the prohibition
against amending existing statutes with general language in a subsequent statute.
State ex rel. McNary v. Stussie, 518 S.W.2d 630 (Mo. En Banc 1974).
17. Id. § 557.011.5.
550 [Vol. 43
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The dispositions authorized for offenses defined under the Code
are detailed for felonies,' 8 misdemeanors,' 9 and infractions. 20 There is
a separate list of authorized dispositions for organizational offenders. 21
These dispositions include sentence to a term of imprisonment, 22 a sen-
tence to pay a fine,23 suspension of imposition of sentence, with or with-
out placing the person on probation, 24 pronouncement of sentence and
suspension of its execution, plading the person on probation,25 imposi-
tion of a period of detention as a condition of probation,26 and imposi-
tion of any special sentence or sanction authorized by law.27
There are authorized ranges of terms of imprisonment for each
class of felony2 8 and misdemeanor. 29 The Code also provides for ex-
tended terms and special terms of imprisonment. The court may sen-
tence a person who has pleaded guilty or has been found guilty or a
class B, C, or D felony to an extended term of imprisonment if it finds
the defendant to be a persistent or dangerous offender. 30 The Code
18. Id. § 557.011.2.
19. Id.
20. Id. § 557.011.3.
21. Id. § 557.011.4.
22. Id. § 557.011.2.
23. Id. §§ 557.011.2-.011.4.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. § 557.011.2.
27. Id. § 557.011.4.
28. Id. § 558.011.1.
29. Id.
30. Id. § 558.016. A persistent offender is one who has been previously con-
victed of two felonies committed at different times and not related to the instant
crime as a single criminal episode. A dangerous offender is one who is being
sentenced for a felony during the commission of which he knowingly murdered
or endangered or threatened the life of another person or knowingly inflicted or
attempted or threatened to inflict serious physicial injury on another person, and
has been previously convicted of a class A or B felony or of a dangerous felony.
"Dangerous felony" means murder, forcible rape, assault, burglarly, robbery,
kidnapping or the attempt to commit any of these felonies. Id. § 556.061.(8).
The dangerous and persistent offender provisions indicate a substantial pro-
cedural change from the Habitual Criminal Act, § 556.280, RSMo 1969 (re-
pealed effective January 1, 1979). The present Habitual Criminal Act provides
for a hearing to determine the Act's applicability prior to the jury retiring for
deliberation and out of the jury's hearing. If the court finds that the defendant
is properly charged under the Act, the jury does not assess punishment at all.
Under the new Code, if the defendant is convicted, he will be sentenced by thejury. After trial, the court will hold a hearing on the applicability of the danger-
ous or persistent offender provision. Under the present Habitual Criminal Act, if
the court's finding is found on appeal to be erroneous, the case must be re-
manded for a new trial. State v. Garrett, 416 S.W.2d 116, 120 (Mo. 19.67). But see
State v. Franklin, 547 S.W.2d 849 (Mo. App., D.K.C. 1977). Under the new
Code, if the court's finding is erroneous, the case need be remanded only for
revision of that finding and disposition consistent with the original verdict.
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specifies certain preliminary procedures for imposition of such an ex-
tended term 3' and provides separate maximum terms for such offen-
ders. 2 In cases of class C and D felonies, the court has the discretion to
imprison the defendant for a special term not to exceed one year in a
place of confinement to be fixed by the court.33 However, if the court
imposes a term longer than one year, it must commit the person to the
custody of the Department of Corrections for a term of not less than two
years.34 The Code provides that multiple sentences of imprisonment
are to run concurrently unless the court specifies that they run consecu-
tively. 35
Each offense having a fine as an authorized punishment is provided
a maximum amount 36 with separate maximums provided for corporate
offenders. 37 A fine exceeding this maximum may be imposed if the
offender derived a pecuniary or proprietary gain from the commission
of the crime. 38 If a fine based on the offender's gain is to be imposed,
the court must make a specific finding as to the amount of that gain. 39
In the case of an offense defined outside the Code providing for a spe-
cial fine for a corporate offender, the court may impose a fine based on
the offender's pecuniary gain even though the statute defining the of-
fense does not so provide. 40
The imposition of a fine is subject to extensive restrictions concern-
ing when such a punishment may be imposed and in what amount.
When any other disposition is authorized, the court may not sentence an
individual to pay a fine only, unless, having regard to the nature and
circumstances of the offense and the history and character of the offen-
der, the court finds that a fine alone will suffice for the protection of the
public. 41 In addtion, the court may not sentence an individual to pay a
fine in addition to any other authorized sentence unless the individual
derived a pecuniary gain from the offense, or the court finds that a fine
is uniquely adapted to deterrence of the type of offense involved or to
the correction of the defendant. 42 If a fine is to be imposed, the court
31. Id. § 558.021.
32. Id. § 558.016.4.
33. Id. § 558.011.2.
34. Id.
35. Id. § 558.026. 1.
36. Id. §§ 560.011.1(1), .016.1.
37. Id. § 560.021.1.
38. Id. §§ 560.011, .016.2, .021.1(6).
39. Id. § 560.011.2.
40. Id. § 560.021.2.
41. Id. § 560.026.2. The Code does not specify that the court must make
such a finding but only that it "be of the opinion" that a fine alone will suffice to
protect the public. However, because this "opinion" is required before a fine may
be imposed, the court should make a finding to that effect.
42. Id. § 560.026.3. See note 41 supra.
552 [Vol. 43
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is directed, insofar as practicable, to proportion the amount and method
of payment of the fine to the burden that such a fine will impose on the
individual, in view of his financial resources. 43 The court may not sen-
tence an offender to pay a fine in any amount which will prevent him
from making restitution or reparation to the victim of the offense. 44
When an offender is sentenced to pay a fine, the court may not impose
at the same time an alternative sentence to be served in the event that
the fine is not paid.45  There are separate provisions setting out the
court's response to nonpayment of a fine.46
The court is given the option of placing a person on probation for a
specific period upon conviction of any offense or upon suspending im-
position of sentence. The Code provides that probation is permissible if,
having regard to the nature and circumstances of the offense and to the
history and character of the defendant, the court is of the opinion that
institutional confinement of the defendant is not necessary for the pro-
tection of the public and that the defendant is in need of guidance,
training or other assistance which, in his case, can be effectively ad-
ministered through probation supervision. 47  Except in infraction cases,
when probation is granted the court may require that the defendant
submit to a period of detention at whatever time or intervals the court
may designate. 4
8
To insure that the court has available the information necessary to
the determination of a proper disposition, the Code requires an investi-
gation and preparation of a presentence report before disposition in all
43. Id. § 560.026.1.
44. Id.
45. Id. § 560.026.5.
46. Id. § 560.031. Upon default in the payment of a fine or of any install-
ment, the court may require the offender to show cause why he should not be
imprisoned for nonpayment. The offender's default is excusable if he can show
that it was not attributable to an intentional refusal to obey the sentence or to a
failure to make a good faith effort to obtain the funds necessary for payment. If
the default is excusable the court can allow additional time for payment, reduce
the amount of the fine, or revoke the fine or the unpaid portion in whole or in
part. Should the offender fail to show cause, the court can imprison the offender
for a term not to exceed 180 days if the fine was imposed upon a felony convic-
tion or 30 days if upon conviction of misdemeanor or infraction. The term may
be later reduced for good cause shown, including payment of the fine.
Default by a corporation can render the persons authorized to make dis-
bursements of corporate assets subject to imprisonment as outlined above.
The court's response to default may be determined only after default. Id. §
560.026.5.
47. Id. § 559.012. See note 41 supra.
48. Id. § 559.026. Such detention, imposed as a condition of probation, is
commonly known as a "split-sentence." The court can designate time or intervals
within the period of probation, consecutive or nonconsecutive, for the defendant
to submit to detention. For misdemeanor convictions, this term cannot exceed 15
days. For felony convictions, this term cannot exceed 60 days.
1978] 553
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felony cases, unless waived by the defendant. 49  In cases of mis-
demeanors and infractions, the probation officer must make such a re-
port only if directed by the court.50
The new Criminal Code also provides a sentencing function for the
jury. The Proposed Code provided for exclusive court sentencing,"1 but
this provision was rejected by the legislature in enacting the new
Code. 52  The enacted Code, however, expressly provides only that the
jury be instructed as to the range of authorized punishments and that
the jury is to "assess and declare" punishment as part of its verdict.5 3 It
does not specify when the jury is to have a sentencing function or the
extent of the jury's authority.
Because the Code does not specify when the jury is to exercise its
sentencing role, it is necessary to look at those situations when the jury
does not "assess and declare" punishment. The Code specifies two such
situations. It provides that, in the event of a finding of guilt by the jury,
the court shall assess punishment should the defendant so request in
writing.54 The Code also provides that the court shall assess punish-
ment when the jury finds the defendant guilty but cannot agree on the
punishment.55
49. Id. § 557.026.1. The report is required only when a probation officer is
available to the court. This provision differs from the statutes in force in two
regards. Current rules provide for such a report only for cases in specified
courts. Mo. R. CIm. P. 27.07. The presentence report is presently purely dis-
cretionary with the trial court. The use of such reports has been encouraged, but
the court's denial of the report's use, even when requested by the defendant, is
discretionary and not reviewable. State v. Tettamble, 517 S.W.2d 732, 735-36
(Mo. App., D. St. L. 1974).
50. Id.
51. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 1, § 2.060.
52. Mo. CRIM. CODE § 557.036.2 (effective January 1, 1979).
53. Id.
54' Id. This procedure is new in Missouri and will allow a defendant with a
favorable record to remove the sentencing question from the jury which does not
receive the presentence report. See Note, Jury Sentencing in Virginia, 53 VA. L.
REv. 968, 989 (1967). This provision may be relatively insignificant if, in practice,
the court is generally not restricted by a jury-determined sentence. The Code
does not specify, however, whether the court is required to assess punishment in
this situation or whether it is discretionary. It probably would not be within the
court's discretion to deny such a request if the court found that the defendant
was knowledgeable of the consequences and voluntarily made the decision. Such
a request is analogous to a guilty plea or a waiver of trial, although there is no
inherent right as such to assessment of punishment by a jury. As with a guilty
plea and a waiver of trial by jury, the court should make a specific finding as to
voluntariness and knowledge prior to accepting the request.
55. Id. 88 557.036.2, .036.3. This authority is currently provided under §
546.440, RSMo 1969 (repealed effective January 1, 1979), but the new Code
alters the time at which the court may instruct the jury that it may return a
verdict only as to guilt. The current provisions allow the court to instruct the
jury on this point when it is charged initially, prior to retiring for deliberation.
554 [Vol. 43
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Although not specified in the Code, there are other situations in
which the jury would not assess punishment. For example, the court will
assess punishment in those situations in which no jury is impanelled, i.e.,
where the defendant pleads guilty prior to trial or waives his right to
trial by jury.56 The court also will assess punishment in situations when
the jury has the authority to assess punishment but returns a guilty ver-
dict that is silent as to punishment.5 7  The court will assess punishment
for corporate defendants charged with an offense not having a special
sentence or sanction authorized by law. Although the Code does not
specify that the court will sentence in this situation, the result is indi-
cated by Code language because the only authorized punishment in such
case is a fine 5 8 and the Code specifies that the court is to fLx the amount
of any fine imposed on a corporate defendant.59
The jury will not assess punishment when no discretion is au-
thorized as to the kind or extent of punishment for the particular indi-
vidual or offense. If the only punishment authorized for a particular de-
fendant or offense is mandatory, the only question for the jury is the
determination of guilt or innocence. This is not a possibility for offenses
defined under the new Code because the Code has no mandatory
punishments. This exception to jury sentencing could apply only to an
Mo. R. CRIm P. 27.02. The new Code provides that the court may give such an
instruction only after the jury has duly deliberated and after the court has made
a finding that the jury cannot agree on punishment. Mo. CRIM. CODE. §
557.036.2 (effective January 1, 1979). The Code does not specify how long the
jury must deliberate before the court is able to find that it cannot agree. There
likely will be no specific time required, but there will be a requirement that,
before such an instruction is given, the jury in fact has agreed that the defendant
is guilty. The law regarding whether and when such an instruction could be
given has varied over the years in Missouri. See generally Freund, Power of a Mis-
souri Court to Instruct the Jury in a Criminal Case That it May Return a General Verdict
of Guilty and Permit the Court to Fix the Punishment, 13 ST. L.L. REv. 25 (1928). Of
primary concern was whether such an instruction invited the jury's abdication of
its sentencing responsibilities. Immediately prior to promulgation of the present
rule it was held that such an instruction could be given only after the jury had
deliberated and had found the defendant guilty. State v. Stuver, 360 S.W.2d 89
(Mo. 1962). The present rule eliminated such a requirement. The new Code
seems to return to the former position that protected against the jury's abdica-
tion of its sentencing responsibilities. The Code does not specifically require that
guilt have been determined before the instruction is given, but the due delibera-
tion requirement is immediately preceded by a provision conditioning the court's
assessing punishment in this situation on the jury's finding of guilt.
56. Mo. R. GRIM. P. 27.03.
57. This is allowed under the statutes currently in force. § 546.440, RSMo
1969 (repealed effective January 1, 1979). Under the new Code, if the jury is
allowed to return a verdict only as to guilt when it cannot agree on punishment,
it also should be able to do so without first receiving the instruction informing it
of that permissible alternative.
58. Mo. ClM. CODE § 557.011.4 (effective January 1, 1979).
59. Id. § 560.021.
1978] 555
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offense defined outside the Code which provides for a mandatory
punishment upon conviction. 60
Thus, by excluding situations where the court is to assess punish-
ment, it is possible to determine when the jury is to carry out that func-
tion. The jury will "assess and declare" punishment as part of its verdict
if there is a trial by jury, if the defendant does not request in writing
that the court assess punishment in the event of a guilty verdict, if there
is an authorized punishment that is not mandatory, and if the defendant
is not a corporation charged with an offense having no special sentence
or sanction authorized by law.
A related question is the extent of the jury's sentencing authority,
i.e., which punishments are within the authority of the jury to assess and
declare. Of the dispositions authorized by the Code, suspension of im-
position of sentence and execution of sentence and probation are clearly
not a jury function. The Code does not specify that the remaining dis-
positions, imprisonment and fines, are within the jury's authority but
does specify some situations where these are to be determined or fixed
by the court. The jury could have the authority to assess and declare
only those specified in the Code to be court-determined. The Code
specifies that the court will determine the special terms of imprisonment
for class C and D felonies, 6' the extended terms of imprisonment under
the dangerous and persistent offender provisions, 62 and fines based on a
pecuniary or proprietary gain obtained by the defendant through the
commission of the crime. 63 The only prison terms and fines not
specified as court-determined are the general ranges of terms of impris-
onment for each class of offense, 64 and the general ranges of fines for
each class of offense.6 5  For those offenses defined outside the Code,
60. Id. § 557.011.1. The most important statute defining an offense outside
the Code is Act No. 11, 1977 Mo. Legis. Serv. 29 (West), which defines the
homocide offenses and provides mandatory sentences for first degree ("felony")
murder.
61. Id. § 558.011.2.
62. Id. § 558.016.
63. Id. §§ 560.011, .016.2. The Code specifies that a fine based on pecuniary
gain from the commission of a class C or D felony will be fixed by the court. Id.
§ 560.011.1(2). The Code does not specify who is to fix the amount of such a
fine for the commission of a misdemeanor or infraction. Id. § 560.016.2.
64. Id. § 558.011.1.
65. Id. §§ 560.011.1, .016.1. The Code could be interpreted to provide that
the assessment of all fines is exclusively within the authority of the court. This
interpretation could be based on the Code language limiting the court to a jury-
determined sentence only with prison terms, § 557.036.1, and the extensive re-
strictions placed on the court on when it may impose a fine and what amount
the fine may be, § 560.026. The better interpretation would seem to be that thejury does have the authority to assess and declare a fine as punishment unless
the Code specifies otherwise as with fines based on gains and fines on corporate
defendants. The restrictions on the imposition of fines are similar to the restric-
tions on other authorized dispositions and warrants no special interpretation.
556 [Vol. 43
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whether the jury should have the authority to assess punishment upon
conviction of such offense should be determined through interpretation
of the statute defining the offense.
Of criticial importance to the practical operation of the sentencing
process under the new Code is the interrelation of the sentencing func-
tions of the court and the jury. The Code directs that the court is to
decide the extent or duration of sentence or other disposition to be im-
posed under all the circumstances.66 When the jury acts within its au-
thority in "assessing and declaring" punishment, the question essentially
becomes to what extent, if any, is the court limited by a punishment
declared by the jury.
The Code language dealing with this question seems clear and un-
ambiguous. The court's responsibility is not limited to those situations
outside the jury's authority to assess punishment. Indeed, the Code pre-
faces the definition of the court's function by providing that it arises
upon a finding of guilt by verdict or plea.67  In this same section the
Code specifies that the court's decision as to the sentence or disposition
to be imposed is limited only in one regard. 68  If the jury returns a
verdict of guilty and "declares" a term of imprisonment, the court can-
not impose a term in excess of that declared by the jury unless (1) the
term declared by the jury is less than the authorized lowest term for the
offense, in which event the court cannot impose a term greater than
the lowest term provided for the offense, or (2) the defendant is found
to be a persistent or dangerous offender. 69 This indicates that the
court's responsibility to decide the extent or duration of sentence or
other disposition to be imposed is as pervasive as the sentencing provi-
sions of the Code and is not limited to those situations outside the jury's
authority to assess punishment or to those punishments specified to be
court-determined. The court's duty and corresponding authority is lim-
ited only by the prison term exception noted above. The court may
choose not to sentence the defendant to the punishment declared by the
jury, may sentence the defendant to a lesser term of imprisonment, may
sentence the defendant to pay a fine greater than that declared by the
jury, or may sentence the defendant to pay a fine even though a fine is
not assessed by the jury."
The fact that the court's authority is limited by a jury-declared
punishment in only one respect could be subject to differing interpre-
tations. The language of the Code's sentencing provisions is ambiguous.
In addition, there is no recorded legislative history which would indicate
66. Id. § 557.036.1.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id. § 557.036.3.
70. See n. 65, supra.
1978] 557
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the legislature's intent in reinstating jury sentencing. It also should be
noted that the Code will be subject to judicial interpretation by the Mis-
souri appellate courts which historically have placed emphasis on jury-
declared punishments.
The sentencing language of the Code defies reconciliation. It pro-
vides that the jury is to "assess and declare" punishment 7 1 but does not
specify when it is to do so or what punishments it may declare. The
Code provides two situations where the court is to "assess" punish-
ment.7 2 It specifies situations where the court is to "fix" or "determine"
punishment.7 3 The court is specifically authorized to "sentence" an in-
dividual to some punishments.7 4 Concluding this array of differing lan-
guage is the almost all-encompassing provision which states that the
court "shall decide the extent or duration of sentence or other disposi-
tion to be imposed under all the circumstances." 7 -5 Thereafter, the au-
thorized dispositions are detailed and include, as a subset, "sen-
tences." 7 6 Reconciliation of this language into an understanding of the
practical effect of the jury's sentencing role under the new Code is dif-
ficult and is compounded by the lack of clear legislative intent.
The Missouri legislature might have removed exclusive court sen-
tencing from the Proposed Code and inserted jury sentencing for several
reasons, none of which are evident. Some of these reasons could logically
explain why there was a single limitation placed upon the court in re-
gard to a jury-determined punishment; some could explain why the ap-
pellate review provision was removed. However, it is difficult to formu-
late a motive which could logically explain both legislative actions.
The legislature might have desired the jury to serve as a sounding
board for the court. The court could consider the jury's opinions as to
the proper punishment when the court determined the proper disposi-
tion. This interpretation, however, does not explain the court's limitation
to a jury-declared term of imprisonment. The legislature might have
been expressing a fear of unduly harsh court-determined punishments.
The limitation may have been provided as a restriction upon the court as
to that punishment with which the legislature was most concerned-a
term of imprisonment. This would logically explain the single limitation
placed on the court, but not the removal of appellate review. Exclusive
court sentencing and appellate review could have been removed from
the Proposed Code for different reasons. There are other possible
reasons for these legislative alterations of the Proposed Code. The
criminal defense bar favors jury sentencing. Statutory appellate review
71. Id. § 557.036.2.
72. Id.
73. Id. §§ 560.011.1(2), .021.
74. Id. § 558.016.1.
75. Id. § 557.036.1.
76. Id. § 557.011.
558 (Vol. 43
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provisions would further burden the appellate courts. The legislature
may simply have been acting conservatively in not drastically changing
the existing law.
Possibly the best interpretation is to consider the enacted provisions
as a compromise between the proponents of exclusive court sentencing
and appellate review and the proponents of jury sentencing. After con-
sideration of the policies and purposes of the Proposed Code, the legis-
lature perhaps determined that the court's discretion should be limited
only in the area of prison terms, which many believe to be unduly severe
when excessive. Such a compromise, however, cannot explain the re-
moval of appellate review, which was designed to guard against excessive
sentences and to achieve consistency by providing uniform sentencing
standards throughout the jurisdiction.
The Code provides for a jury sentencing function but also requires
the court to determine the extent or duration of sentence or other dis-
position, only restricting the court from imposing a term of imprison-
ment greater than that declared by the jury. The statutes currently in
force provide for a jury sentencing function but also authorize the courts
to review and reduce jury-determined punishments.7 7  However, the
appellate courts have determined that this authority is available only to
the trial court78 and, although recognizing this authority, have not en-
couraged its use. Assessing punishment has been seen as primarily a jury
function,7 9 and a punishment within the statutory authorization cannot
be adjudged excessive.80 The trial court's review of a jury-determined
punishment is found by the appellate courts to be purely discretionary
and not reviewable unless clear evidence of passion and prejudice ap-
pears in the record.81 It is also clear under the present statutes that no
sentence may be imposed which is in excess of that declared by the
jury.82
The present statutes authorizing the trial court to review and reduce
jury sentences have been found to be discretionary with the trial court.
The trial court cannot impose a sentence greater than that declared by
77. § 546.430, RSMo 1969 (repealed effective January 1, 1979).
78. Although not specifically stated, this is the effective result as the appellate
courts will not interfere with a punishment declared by the jury absent a showing
that passion and prejudice so clearly appears from the record that the trial court
abused its discretion in declining to reduce punishment. State v. Agee, 474
S.W.2d 817, 820-21 (Mo. 1971); State v. Rule, 543 S.W.2d 325, 326 (Mo. App.,
D.K.C. 1976).
79. State v. Rizor, 353 Mo. 368, 374-75, 182 S.W.2d 525, 529 (1944); State v.
Bevins, 328 Mo. 1046, 1050-53, 43 S.W.2d 432, 434-36 (En Banc 1931).
80. State v. Smith, 445 S.W.2d 326, 332 (Mo. 1969); State v. Jenkins, 327
Mo. 326, 335, 37 S.W.2d 433, 436 (1931).
81. State v. Laster, 365 Mo. 1076, 1083, 293 S.W.2d 300, 304-05 (En Banc
1956).
82. State v. Hardy, 339 Mo. 897, 902, 98 S.W.2d 593, 596 (1936).
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the jury. The Code seems to require a more active role for the trial court
in determining the proper disposition and limits the court only with re-
gard to a jury-declared prison term. It is questionable, however, that the
Missouri appellate courts will require this active trial court function given
the ambiguous language of the Code, the lack of discernable legislative
intent, and the attitude of the courts in emphasizing the primary sen-
tencing function of the jury. This is especially true because the legisla-
ture rejected appellate review of sentences. Unless the appellate courts
begin on their own to review sentences, it will be difficult for them to
require and supervise an active trial court sentencing function. Such an
active role, therefore, would remain discretionary with the trial court as
it is under present law.
A related problem concerns the sentencing instructions to be given
the jury. The new Code provides that the court shall instruct the jury as
to the range of punishment authorized by statute. 83 It does not specify
whether the jury is to be instructed only when it is to assess punishment
or on all occasions. It does not specify whether the punishments in-
structed upon are to be only those within the authority of the jury to
assess or the complete range of punishments that could be imposed by
the court. There are several supportable interpretations of this instruc-
tion requirement. Perhaps the preferable reading of the instruction re-
quirement is that the jury is to receive sentencing instructions only when
it is to assess punishment, and such instructions should include only
those punishments within the jury's authority to assess.
The Proposed Code included a provision requiring a jury instruc-
tion on the range of authorized terms of imprisonment, even though the
court had exclusive sentencing authority.84 That provision represented a
compromise between exclusive judicial sentencing and jury sentencing. It
probably was included to take into account the fact that juries do con-
sider the possible punishment in determining the question of guilt or
innocence. 85 However, even under the Proposed Code, which required
instructions on the authorized prison terms, it is questionable whether all
prison terms authorized for the particular case would have been in-
structed upon. The purpose of the provision was to apprise the jury of
those terms the court could impose after a jury finding of guilt, i.e., the
immediate consequences of the jury determination. Its purpose was not to
apprise the jury of all the possible consequences of such a finding.
It cannot be argued that under the proposed provision the court
would have instructed the jury on the extended term provisions of the
dangerous and persistent offender sections. However, such a term is also
a consequence of the jury's determination, because a determination of
83. MO. CRIM. CODE § 557.036.2 (effective January 1, 1979).
84. PROPOSED CODE, supra note 1, § 2.060(2).
85. Id. in Comments.
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guilt for the charged felony is a condition precedent to the applicability
of the dangerous and persistent offender provisions.8 6 Under the pres-
ent Habitual Criminal Act 8 7 and the new Code's dangerous and persis-
tent offender provisions, 88 the court determines the applicability of such
provisions out of the presence of the jury to protect against the prejudi-
cial effect such charges would have on the jury.
There are two viewpoints concerning the sentencing instructions to
be received by the jury. The first would inform the jury of all the possi-
ble consequences of a guilty verdict. It is justified by recognizing that
juries often consider the possible punishments when determining guilt.
The Proposed Code adopted this rationale but, as noted, did not provide
for instruction on all the possible consequences of a guilty verdict. This
provision was provided partially as a compromise between exclusive
court sentencing and jury sentencing. This compromise function of sen-
tencing instructions is no longer necessary because the legislature pro-
vided for a jury role in sentencing in the enacted Code.
The second rationale would call for sentencing instructions only
when the jury is to assess punishment and would instruct only to the
extent necessary for the jury to exercise its authority. In those situations
where the jury is to assess punishment, the primary objective of the in-
structions would be to convey the necessary information on the punish-
ments the jury is authorized to assess. To instruct the same jury on
.punishments not within its authority would be confusing and thereby
unwarranted by any possible benefit such instructions might have. A
more compelling argument for this view is consistent with a widely ac-
cepted argument in favor of exclusive court sentencing: that jury sen-
tencing debilitates the jury's primary function-to decide the guilt or
innocence of the accused.8 9 Once the jury concerns itself with the con-
sequences of its determination, there is a possibility that the "beyond a
reasonable doubt" standard will be endangered. 90
The sentencing provisions of the new Code are sufficiently precise
in most areas to 'facilitate interpretation. The major difficulties seem to
be the lack of a clear definition of the jury's actual role, the breadth of
the instructions the jury should receive, and when the jury is to be in-
structed. The difficulties are due primarily to imprecise language and
lack of discernible legislative intent. The jury should serve as a guide for
the court, but the court should determine the proper disposition without
86. Mo. CruM. CODE § 558.016 (effective January 1, 1979).
87. § 556.280, RSMo 1969 (repealed effective January 1, 1979).
88. Mo. CRIM. CODE §§ 558.016, .021 (effective January 1, 1979).
89. See AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON SENTENCING
AND REVIEW, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCE-
DURES 46 (1967) [hereinafter cited as ABA STANDARDS]; Note, Jury Sentencing in
Virginia, 53 VA. L. REv. 968, 985-86 (1967).
90. See ABA STANDARDS, supra note 89, at 46; Note, supra note 89, at 986-87.
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restriction to the jury-declared punishment except for prison terms. The
court has the presentence report available and also is more knowledge-
able and skilled in sentencing than is the jury. The jury should not re-
ceive instructions except when it is to "assess and declare" punishment.
When instructed, it should receive instruction only on those punishments
within its authority to declare. Interpretation of the Code in this manner
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